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WETLANDS REGULATION:
THE "TAKING" PROBLEM AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY INTERESTS
The importance of the coastal wetland ecosystem' and the serious-
ness of despoilation by landfilling has prompted increased state regula-
tion of commercial wetland development. 2 Difficulty has arisen in
reconciling the need for such regulation with the impairment of the
I. Wetlands operate as natural storage basins for flood prevention and as natural
breakwaters against tidal action, are important in maintaining groundwater levels, and
produce abundant vegetation. This plant growth is an essential element in the food chain of
fish and game. Two out of every three species of Atlantic fish depend in some way upon
tidal lands and water for their survival; 90% of all fish caught by man are taken in shallow
coastal waters. In 1967 commercial fishing brought $438 million to U.S. fishermen,
two-thirds of which came from estuarine dependent species. Wetlands are also critical in
the survival of water fowl, fur-bearing animals, turkeys, and white-tail deer. They are
often used to cultivate wild rice and cranberries and also serve as open spaces with
recreational and educational value. Binder, Taking v. Reasonable Regulation: A Reapprai-
sal in Light of Regional Planning and Wetlands, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 19-25 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Binder]. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING
ISSUE 3-6 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BOSSELMANI; TASKFORCE ON LAND USE AND URBAN
GROWTH, THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZEN'S POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH 14 (1973);
Ausness, Land Use Controls in CoastalAreas, 9 CALIF. WESTERN L. REV. 391,408 (1973).
2. In general these statutes all contain similar provisions which define wetlands,
establish procedures for obtaining permits to fill or dredge, empower a respective agency
to enforce the statute, and establish judicial review. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§
66600-58 (Deering 1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-28 to 45 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. §
45-136 to -147 (1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4702-4709 (1974); MD. NAT. RES.
CODE ANN. 33 9-101 to -501 (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, § 105 (Supp. 1974);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13, 9A-! to A-10 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION
LAW §§ 24-0 101 to - 1303, 25- 101 to -602 (1973) (the latter sections deal with tidal wetlands);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-229 to -230 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAW ANN. § 11-46.1-1, as amended
(Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-13.1 to -13.20 (Supp. 1972). The California, Connec-
ticut, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and Virginia statutes also contain statements
of public policy.
The New York and California statutes are the largest and most comprehensive. New
York has two separate statutes, one dealing with fresh-water wetlands and the other
dealing with tidal wetlands. N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW 33 24-0101 to
-1303. 25-101 to -602 (1973). The California statute, which established the San Francisco
Bay Conservation and Development Commission, is the most detailed. It includes eleven
separate statements of findings and declarations of public policy, a detailed definition of
San Francisco Bay, detailed provisions creating and empowering the commission, and
provisions for a comprehensive plan for the development of San Francisco Bay. CAL.
GOV'T. CODE § 66600-58 (Deering 1974).
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private owner's valuable use of his wetland property. 3 The recent New
Hampshire case of Sibson v. State4 illustrates one approach to resolving
this problem but does not offer a wholly satisfactory solution.
The Sibson case concerned a state regulation that prohibited the
filling of saltmarshes without a permit from the State Water Resources
Board.5 The board had denied plaintiff-owners a permit to fill four acres
of marsh to enable development of a residential subdivision. 6 Plaintiffs
appealed to the superior court7 contending that denial of the permit
constituted a taking under the eminent domain clauses of the New
Hampshire and United States Constitutions.8 The superior court sus-
tained the report of a judicial referee dismissing the appeal and trans-
3. The general difficulty is disagreement over the standard used to determine whether
the legislation in effect confiscates the private owner's property. See BOSSELMAN, supra
note 1, at 318-19; Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 165
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Berger]; Binder, supra note 1, at I; Stevers, Land Use
Controls, Takings and the Police Power: A Discussion of the Myth, 15 N.H.B. J. 149 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Stevers]. See generally Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation "Law, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1165 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Michelman]; Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public
Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Sax, Takings, Private Property and
Public Rights]; Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Sax, Takings and the Police Power].
4. 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975).
5. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 483-A: to -A:4, as amended, (Supp. 1973). The statute
sets forth the legislature's conclusion that the regulatory protection of wetlands serves the
public welfare by preserving the value of such areas as sources of nutrients and places of
reproduction for fish, plants and wildlife. Id. § 483-A: 1-b. Under the statute no person is
allowed to excavate, remove, fill or dredge any bank, flat, marsh or swamp in or adjacent
to any waters of the state (as defined by § 483-A: i-a) without giving written notice of his
intention to the Water Resources Board. Id. § 483-A:1. The board must hold a public
hearing within thirty days of receipt of the notice and "may deny the petition, or require
the installation of bulkheads, barriers, proper retention and/or containment structures to
prevent subsequent fill runoff into tidal water or other protective measures." Id. §§
483-A:2, 483-A:3.
6. 115 N.H. at-, 336 A.2d at 240. The land in question was a fouracre parcel of a six
acre area of saltmarsh (the remaining two acres had been filled previously). It is part of a
100 acre tidal wetlands area known as Awcomin Marsh. Plaintiffs purchased the property
(for $18,500) as a site for their residence and as a speculative investment. Brief for the
State at vi., Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975).
7. 115 N.H. at-, 336 A.2d at 240. The statute allows appeal to the superior court of
the county where the land in question is located. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 483-A:4, I
(1973). If the superior court determines that the board's decision is equivalent to a taking
without compensation, and that determination becomes final, the superior court will then
assess the landowner's damages. Id. § 483-A:4 11.
8. 115 N.H. at-, 336 A.2d at 241 (1975). The New Hampshire Constitution provides:
"[N]o part of a man's property shall be taken from him, or applied to public uses, without
his own consent, or that of the representative body of the people." N.H. CONST. art. 12.





ferred plaintiffs' exceptions to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.9
The Supreme Court upheld the denial of the permit as a valid exercise of
the police power.' 0
Historically, there has been no conceptual problem in defining "tak-
ing" I1 to include actual physical appropriation or divestment of title by
the government. 2 The focus has been on governmental regulations that
are confiscatory in practice, i.e. de facto taking. 13 Before the Civil War
the United States Supreme Court had little occasion to consider this
issue.14 The state courts at that time had established a "noxious use"
doctrine which held that the reasonable exercise of the police power
designed to protect the public from harm was not an unconstitutional
taking. 5 The Supreme Court adopted this approach in Mugler v. Kan-
sas 16 and applied the test until 1922 when Justice Holmes, in Pennsyl-
9. 115 N.H. at -, 336 A.2d at 240. The referee's report concluded that the property
was part of a "valuable ecological asset" of the seacoast area which the proposed fill
would irreparably damage.
10. Id. at -, 336 A.2d at 243.
!1. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution requires that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation being paid. U.S.
CONST. amend. V. This has been construed to mean that before the federal government or
the states are required to compensate a private property owner, there must be a finding
that the property in question was "taken." Cf. Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co.,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
12. BOSSELMAN, supra note 1, at 106; Comment, Land Use Regulation and the Concept
of Taking in 19th Century America, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 854 (1973).
13. BOSSELMAN, supra note 1, at 3; see Berger, supra note 3, at 165; Michelman, supra
note 3. at 1167-68; Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, supra note 3, at 151;
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, supra note 3, at 36.
14. BOSSELMAN, supra note 1, at 114-15. Prior to the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, the fifth amendment was construed as a restraint only on the federal govern-
ment and not the states. Regulatory taking problems were generally local in nature and
concerned state constitutional provisions. They did not affect the federal government. See
Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84(1857); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243
(1833).
15. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851) (statute prohibting
the building of a wharf beyond a certain line held not to be a taking even though the wharf
was wholly within the owner's property); Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (II
Metc.) 55 (1846) (statute which prohibited an owner from removing gravel from his private
beach held not to be a taking of the land for a public purpose); Stuyvesant v. Mayor of New
York, 7 Cow. 588 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (New York City ordinance limiting cemeteries to
certain parts of the city held not to be a taking).
16. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Mugler concerned the beer manufacturers of Kansas who
protested the 1880 Kansas constitutional amendment which prohibited the manufacture
and sale of intoxicating liquors. At issue was whether prohibition amounted to a taking
since its effect was to materially diminish the value of the manufacturers' brewery
property. Id. at 655-57. Finding against the brewers, the Court restated the "noxious use"
doctrine as follows: "A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are
19761
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vania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 17 enunciated the diminution of value test. The
Court recognized that to some extent all governmental regulation of
property diminishes the value of the property, but held that when a
regulation eliminates practically all the value of the property, it amounts
to an unconstitutional taking. 11 The diminution of value test has become
the dominant standard cited by state courts to determine the "taking"
effect of state regulations. 9 It has been used in numerous state court
declared by valid legislation to be injurious to the health, 'morals, or safety of the
community, cannot in any sense be deemed a taking. . . for the public benefit." Id. at
668.
17. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the mining of coal in such a
way as to cause the subsidence of any structure used for human habitation held to be a
taking).
18. Justice Holmes explained:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long
recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the
police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract
and due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such
limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if
not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
sustain the act. So the question depends upon the particular facts.
Id. at 413. For other Holmes opinions on this concept see Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter,
209 U.S. 349 (1908) (statute made it unlawful to transport water from any body of water in
New Jersey to any other state); Interstate Consol. Street Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S.
79 (1907) (statute required street railways to carry school children at a reduced rate);
Hideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 19 N.E. 390 (1889) (statute prohibited the construction of
"spite" fences over six feet in height).
Later Supreme Court decisions have been reluctant to rely on the diminution of value
test. In two zoning regulation cases, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926), and Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), the Court upheld the regulation
without reaching the taking issue. But in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), the Court
upheld a statute requiring the destruction of red cedar trees without compensation to the
owners because the trees contained a parasite harmful to apple orchards, citing Mugleras
authority. See BOSSELMAN, supra note 1, at 136-38. More recently in Town of Hempstead
v. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), the Court used a composite approach, balancing the
extent of the diminution of the property value against the importance of the regulation to
public safety and welfare and the availability of alternative means of regulation, to uphold
a regulation prohibiting the operation of a gravel pit in an urbanized area. See BOSSELMAN,
supra note !, at 138; Note, Wetlands Statutes: Regulation or Taking ?, 5 CONN. L. REV. 64,
80 (1972).
19. BOSSELMAN, supra note I, at 138; Berger, supra note 3, at 176. New Hampshire
case law illustrates the legal evolution of the diminution of value test, roughly similar to the
national pattern. The New Hampshire Supreme Court first adopted the "noxious use"
doctrine in State v. Griffin, 69 N.H. 1, 39 A. 260 (1897). In Bigelow v. Whitcomb, 72 N.H.
473, 57 A. 680 (1904), the New Hampshire court set forth an early variant of the diminution
of value test which held the permanent deprivation of a private property owner's use of his
property or the profits derived from the property was a taking. Id. at 484, 57 A. at 686.
More recently the court has held that zoning regulations which deprived the private owner
of the only and best use of his land are unconstitutional takings. Town of Surry v. Starkey,




decisions to invalidate zoning, 20 floodplains, 21 and wetlands
regulations .22
Sibson is the most recent in a series of cases upholding fill permits as a
valid form of wetlands regulation?23 The Sibson court, however,
rejected the diminution of value test,24 preferring instead a composite
approach based on the "noxious use" doctrine. The composite
approach balances the relative interest of the state in preventing harm to
gravel from their land in violation of local zoning ordinance); cf. Carterv. Town of Derry,
113 N.H. 1,300 A.2d 53 (1973) (plaintiff had applied for a variance from local ordinance to
construct a seasonal dwelling on an undersized lot); Flanagan v. Town of Hollis, 112 N.H.
222, 293 A.2d 328 (1972) (town had amended its zoning ordinance in effect to prohibit
plaintiff from excavating gravel from his land); R.A. Vachon & Sons, Inc. v. City of
Concord, 112 N.H. 107, 289 A.2d 646 (1972) (after plaintiff had secured approval from the
city planning board for the layout of the lots in a subdivision development which then
conformed to the existing zoning ordinance, the town amended its zoning ordinance to
increase minimum lot size requirements); Lachapelle v. Town of Goffstown, 107 N.H.
485, 225 A.2d 624 (1967) (town denied plaintiff's petition for a variance from the local
zoning ordinance regulating motor vehicle junk yards).
20. See, e.g., Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964)
(plaintiff's land had been zoned Single Residence District-Rural for the purpose of
encouraging land to be kept in its natural state); Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278
N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938) (zoning ordinance which permanently restricted property
so that it could not be used for any reasonable purpose went beyond regulation and held as
a taking of the property).
21. See, e.g., Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770
(1964) (local floodplain zoning classification prevented residential and most commercial
construction on the plaintiff's land). But seeTurnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284
N.E. 891 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1972) (Floodplains zoning regulation was upheld, despite
diminution of the value of the plaintiff's land).
22. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); Morris County Land Improve-
ment Co. v. Township of Parsipanny-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
23. Candlestick Prop. Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, II
Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970) (legislative statements clearly defined the public
interest and established a rational basis for the legislature to prevent bay land owners from
filling those lands); Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of Maryland, 266 Md. 358,
293 A.2d 241 (1972) (dredge and fill statute upheld as a legitimate exercise of the police
power); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsipanny-Troy Hills, 40
N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963) (plaintiff's swamp property was placed in a floodwater
detention basin with the object of retaining the land in its natural state; special permit was
required to fill the land); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972)
(county ordinance that prohibited the filling of wetlands contiguous to navigable waters
without a special permit upheld). Contra, State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970)
(prohibition against filling wetland was an unreasonable exercise of the police power).
24. 115 N.H. at -, 336 A.2d at 241. The court accepted the state's argument that the
Holmes diminution of value formula was imprecise and unsuited to the problems of
wetland preservation.
25. 115 N.H. at-, 336 A.2d at 241.43. The court maintained that so long as the action
of the state was a valid exercise of the police power, it would not be a taking. The court
distinguished this from the state's appropriations of private property for public use, where
compensation would be required.
1976]
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the public against the interests of the private owners.26 In applying this
test Sibson relied on the landmark case of Just v. Marinette County9
7
which refused to consider the appreciated value of the land if filled, 28
since filling would have impaired the public interest. 29 The court also
distinguished Sibson from a series of New Hampshire cases that had
applied a variation of the diminution of value test to zoning regulations
of current uses.30
In contrast to Sibson, the Maine Supreme Court in State v. Johnson31
26. The composite approach analyzes the validity of the state action by balancing "the
importance of the public benefit which is sought to be promoted against the seriousness of
the restriction of a private right sought to be imposed." Richardson v. Beattie, 98 N.Y. 7 1,
75-76, 95 A.2d 122, 125 (1953) (state board of health had prohibited all human activity in
certain areas of a lake to prevent contamination of a city water supply). In balancing these
considerations, there is a presumption in favor of the state regulation. The regulation will
be sustained unless the public interest is so clearly of minor importance as to make the
restriction of private rights unreasonable. Shirley v. New Hampshire Water Pollution
Comm'n, 100 N.H. 294, 124 A.2d 189 (1956) (state water pollution commission issued a
cease and desist order to enjoin a town from discharging untreated sewage); Dederick v.
Smith, 88 N.H. 63, 184 A. 595 (1936) (state veterinarian forciby entered plaintiff's
property to examine cattle for tuberculosis); Woolf v. Fuller, 87 N.H. 64, 174 A. 193 (1934)
(statute requiring itinerant vendors to pay a license fee applied to plaintiffs who temporar-
ily operated a retail shoe store). See note 18 supra.
27. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (plaintiff filled a portion of his wetland
property in violation of a county ordinance prohibiting such filling without first obtaining a
permit).
28. The Sibson court agreed with the referee's determination that none of the tradi-
tional uses of marshlands, e.g., wildlife observation, hunting, clam and shellfish harvest-
ing, had been denied plaintiffs. The board's denial of the permit was not seen as a denial of
the plaintiff's current use of the marsh, but rather as the prevention of a major change in
the marsh for speculative profit: "An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to
change the essential character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was
unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of others." 115 N.H. at -, 336
A.2d at 243, quoting, Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768
(1972).
If the land in Sibson had been filled and subdivided as planned, it would have been worth
approximately $158,000. In its unfilled condition the land was of no economic value. Brief
for Plaintiff at V., Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975).
29. It seems to us that filling a swamp not otherwise commercially usable is not in
and of itself an existing use, which is prevented, but rather is the preparation for some
future use which is not indigenous to a swamp. Too much stress is laid on the right of
an owner to change commercially valueless land when that change does damage to the
rights of the public.
Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d. 7, 18, 201 N.W.2d 761, 770 (1972). The court also
emphasized Wisconsin's public trust doctrine which requires that "the state not only
promote navigation but also. . . protect and preserve those waters for fishing, recreation
and scenic beauty." Id. at 13, 201 N.W.2d at 768.
30. Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124,._, 336 A.2d 239,242-43 (1975). The court expressed
an unwillingness to extend its holding in Sibson to the line of zoning cases dealing with
legitimate current uses which are the most feasible uses of the zoned property. Id. at -,
336 A.2d at 242. See note 19, supra, for a discussion of these zoning cases.
31. 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970). See also Halperin, Conservation, Policy and the Role of




relied heavily on the diminution of value test to declare a wetlands
regulation unconstitutional as a taking. 32 Using the prospective value of
the land in a filled state as a basis, the court determined the extent of the
private owners' loss and found that the owners had been deprived of the
reasonable use of their property. The regulation was "both an unreason-
able exercise of the police power and equivalent to taking." 33
Johnson and Sibson represent the extremes in resolving the conflict
between the public interest in preventing despoilation of wetlands and
the protection of private property rights. Johnson relied heavily on the
diminution of value test and considered the appreciated value of the
filled property. 4 Sibson discounts both of these considerations.3 5
Both approaches, however, are subject to significant criticism. Many
commentators have asserted that the diminution of value test, relied on
in Johnson, is inadequate.3 6 Particular criticism has focused upon the
inequities of valuing property interests 37 and the questionable fairness
of a decision which relies almost solely on the value of the property. 8
The test has also been challenged as inconsistent with previous constitu-
tional law and the historical bases of the fifth amendment. 39 The Sibson
approach, however, does not offer a wholly sound alternative.. A
doctrine which reasons that a property owner may not use his land for
any purpose which may cause harm to the public can be extended to
encompass actions by private property owners that heretofore have
never been characterized as harmful to the public. Such extension of the
definition operates to reduce the private ownership interest, in develop-
32. 265 A.2d 711,715. In Johnson, the Wetlands Control Board rejected the landown-
ers' application for a permit to fill their wetlands property for building purposes.
33. Id. at 716.
34. Id.
35. See notes 26-29 and accompanying text supra.
36. BOSSELMAN, supra note I, at 238-55, Berger, supra note 3, at 176; Binder, supra
note 1, at 4; Michelman, supra note 3, at 1190-93; Sax, Takings, Private Property and
Public Rights, supra note 3, at 151-52; Sax, Takings and the Police Power, supra note 3, at
37-38; Stevers, supra note 3, at 159-62.
37. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, supra note 3, at 37-38; Stevers, supra note 3, at
159-62.
38. Michelman, supra note 3, at 1190-93.
39. BOSSELMAN, supra note 1, at 238-40; Stevers, supra note 3, at 159-62.
40. Justice Holmes expressed a fear of this in his opinion in Pennsylvania Coal: "When
this seemingly absolute protection [of private property] is found to be qualified by the
police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification more and
more until at last private property disappears." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 415 (1922). This problem is due, in part, to the difficulty of defining the concept of
harm. Neither the courts nor commentators have adequately dealt with the problem.
Professor Sax would limit harm to specific categories, i.e., uses that "physically restrict a
1976]
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ment of the land, as in Sibson. Prior to the recognition of the important
environmental role of wetlands, the property owner's speculative inter-
est in filling the marshland for commercial purposes was generally
recognized since such commercial development was seen as the only
practical use.41 The importance of private property interests is reflected
in a variety of proposals which account for the landowner's speculative
concern based on cost-benefit analysis and resource allocation. 42 Sib-
son effectively eliminates these interests by refusing to take into
account the value of the marshland in its filled state.
The conflict involved in the regulatory taking issue is too complex to
be resolved entirely by either the diminution of value approach or the
Sibson approach. The net result of the respective approaches is confu-
sion in those difficult cases where the court feels forced to choose
between substantial harm to the public and destruction of important
private property interests. 43
An alternative approach to resolving these difficult cases would be to
uphold the regulation when use of the police power is the only feasible
means of protecting the public interests. The existence of an alternative
that would protect the private property owner's interest as well as
protect the public interest would show that the use of the police power
neighbor, burden a common, impose on the community an affirmative burden of providing
public services, or adversely affect some interest in health or well-being." Sax, Takings,
Private Property and Public Rights, supra note 3, at 151-52. See also 86 HARV. L. REV.
1582, 1590-91 (1973).
41. Cf. Binder, supra note 1, at 25-30. Wetlands are ideal locations for airports,
garbage dumps, and industrial and residential developments. Id. at 25.
42. Ausness, Land Use Controls in Coastal Areas, 9 CALIF. WESTERN L. REV. 391,
418-23 (1973); Berger, supra note 3, at 193-226 (first-in-time approach provides a means of
dealing with the taking problem based on estoppel); Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,
1115-24 (1972) (discussion of a method of choice between alternative means of wealth
distribution based on use of the alternative with the greatest economic efficiency);
Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973)
(development potential of a piece of property is transferred to another piece of property);
Michelman, supra note 3 (cost-benefit analysis based on utilitarian philosophy); Sax,
Takings, Private Property, and'Public Rights, supra note 3 (argues that owner of property
is entitled to the highest and best use of his land that can be made without producing
adverse effects on health or property of others); Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
supra note 3 (discusses the government as arbiter and as participant in competition among
conflicting interests in property uses as a basis for distinguishing "takings" and exercises
of the police power); Waite, Governmental Powerand Private Property, 16 CATHoLIc U.L.
REV. 283, 284-85 (1967) (discusses the economic and social effects of government on
private property).
43. Compare State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970), with Just v. Marinette County,




was not absolutely necessary." Such an approach would have the prac-
tical effect of encouraging the use of alternatives that better balance
public and private interests. In those cases involving multiple alterna-
tives, that alternative which adequately protects the public interest with
the least invasion of private interests should be chosen.
The state can protect tidal wetlands through either large-scale use of
the power of eminent domain or use of a police power regulation similar
to zoning. A strict application of the diminution of value test would
prevent use of the police power and leave only the state power of
eminent domain." Such large-scale use of the eminent domain power,46
however, would make the cost of preserving tidal wetlands prohibi-
tive.47 In those states with a smaller total acreage of wetlands or
endangered areas, the use of the eminent domain power might be less
expensive and less impractical. Factors to be considered in determining
the feasibility of such an alternative include the absolute cost of the use
of the eminent domain power, the social costs (measured by cost-benefit
analysis), the economic and social effects of increased government
regulation,48 and the public benefit derived from wetlands preservation.
Another approach applicable to the regulatory taking issue is the
first-in-time analysis developed by Professor Berger.49 Under this
44. Underlying this analytical approach is a pragmatic recognition that private owner-
ship interests are important, but often in conflict with equally important public interests. It
recognizes that unnecessary invasion of either interest may lead to significant physical,
economic and social damage. SeeTown of Hempstead v. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
45. Brief for the State at 1, 8, 12, Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124,336 A.2d 239 (1975).
46. The cost of the use of the power of eminent domain to purchase all privately-owned
wetlands in New Hampshire was estimated at $178 million. Id. at 1.
47. Id. at 8.
48. Id. at 1, 8, 12.
49. Berger, supra note 3, at 193-226. Professor Berger outlines a rather complex set of
tentative rules for applying the first-in-time approach. Id. at 223-26. Rule 7 outlines in
detail the application of the approach to the regulatory takings problem:
If at the time of detrimental act [defined in rule I(a) to refer to that time when an
owner of land enters into a binding agreement to purchase realty or to construct
improvements upon it] an owner of land knows or should know of governmental plans
to prohibit by local regulation his projected activity in that place, and such a regula-
tion is later passed, the regulation is not an unconstitutional taking of his property no
matter how adversely the regulation affects him. But if at the time of detrimental act
the owner does not know and should not know of the plans, or if in fact there then are
no such plans at all, and such a regulation, later passed, causes a decrease in the value
of his land, then
(a) if the harms inflicted by the activity are less than the benefits it confers, and if
(I) the decrease in value to the owner's property caused by the regulation is
substantial, the regulation should be declared void as an unconstitutional taking; but if
(2) the decrease in value to the owner's property caused by the regulation is
less than substantial, the regulation should go into effect and compensation be paid
1976]
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analysis, an owner's knowledge of government plans to prohibit
development activities by regulation will prevent any subsequent
restriction of land use from being an unconstitutional taking despite its
effect on property values. 50 If the property owner has no reason to know
of such regulation, he will then be entitled to compensation based on the
difference between the value of the property after the enactment of the
regulation and the value it would have had if there had been no regula-
tion. 51 The first-in-time analysis appears to be preferable to the public-
private interest balancing test formulated by the Sibson court. The
government's need to pay compensation is restricted to a narrow set of
circumstances and a form of equitable protection is extended to truly
unknowledgeable property owners.
Sibson upheld the fill permit system of wetlands regulation under a
test which courts have refused to apply in other taking cases involving
traditional zoning regulations. 52 Despite recognition of the importance
of the environmental issues involved, the court failed to adequately
resolve the public versus private interest conflict inherent in the regula-
tory taking issue. Neither the police power analysis used in Sibson nor
the diminution of value doctrine which it rejected have been totally
satisfactory. Alternative approaches must be sought.
Gary R. Garretson
measured by the difference between the value of the land immediately after the
enactment of the regulation and the value it would have had at that time if there had
been no regulation.
(b) if the harms inflicted by the activity are more than the benefits it confers, the
regulation should go into effect and compensation be paid measured by the difference
between the value of the land immediately after enactment of the regulation and the
value it would have had at that time if there had been no regulation.
Id. at 224-25.
50. Id. at 196.
51. Id. See discussion of diminution of value test notes 19 & 30 supra.
52. See note 23 supra.
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